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AN ANALYSIS OF SILKWOOD V. KERR-
MCGEE CORP.-ARE PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARDS AND EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL
REGULATION CONSISTENT?
The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the
greatest possible complexity: and therefore no simple disposi-
tion or direction of power can be suitable either to man's na-
ture, or to the quality of his affairs.
Edmund Burke
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,1 a majority2 of the
United States Supreme Court rejected the appellee's contention
that a punitive damages award, because of its strictly regulatory
purpose, 3 was inconsistent with the exclusive federal nuclear reg-
ulatory scheme.4 Thus, the sovereign role 5 of federal regulators
and the ability of Congress to preclude state interference with
federal regulation is now in doubt.
Karen Silkwood was employed as a laboratory analyst for
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation,6 a subsidiary and "mere in-
strumentality" of Kerr-McGee Corporation.7 Kerr-McGee's Cim-
maron plant, where Silkwood worked, fabricated plutonium fuel
1. 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
2. In this close decision, Justice White wrote for the majority which included Jus-
tices Brennan, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Marshall joined, and Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined.
3. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
4. The exclusivity of the pervasive federal nuclear regulatory scheme was judicially
determined by the Supreme Court in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes
78-79.
5. The sovereign role of federal regulators in a preempted area is based on the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. See infra note 74. This Note will
focus on federal regulators in preempted areas. The question of what role regulatory
compliance should play in state tort claims for punitive damages, however, is not limited
to either federal regulators or preempted areas.
6. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 617 (1984).
7. Id. at 617 n.1.
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rods for use in nuclear power plants.8 In early November 1974,
Silkwood was contaminated with plutonium.9 Following her un-
expected death,10 Karen Silkwood's father, Bill Silkwood,
brought suit as administrator of her estate. The action was
based upon tort,1 the Civil Rights Act of 1871,12 and the Consti-
tution.13 Damages were sought for nine days of "fear and anxi-
8. Id. at 617.
9. Specifically, plutonium contamination on Silkwood's person was detected on No-
vember 5, 6, and 7, 1974. Id. at 618.
10. Silkwood was killed in an automobile accident on November 13, 1974. Id. at 618
(citing the circuit court opinion, 667 F.2d 908, 912 (10th Cir. 1981)). Although the court
of appeals affirmatively declared the accident to be "unrelated" to the facts or merits of
the case, 667 F.2d at 912, the district court had acknowledged "public speculation...
surround[ing] the facts of this case. . . ." 485 F. Supp. 566, 571 (W.D. Okla. 1979). In
fact, Silkwood was on her way to meet a New York Times reporter and a leader of the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) when her fatal accident occurred. 667
F.2d at 914. Silkwood, as the elected member of the union negotiating team responsible
for health and safety matters, "was engaged in collecting information and recording it in
notebooks and on tapes" in order to document union allegations of health and safety
violations for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), predecessor of the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC). 667 F.2d at 913. The public speculation surrounding the case
and Silkwood's role as union investigator served as the focal points of a motion picture
based on the Silkwood incident.
11. The plaintiff's tort theories included negligence in allowing plutonium to escape
the defendant's plant and a claim of strict liability in tort. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff based on both theories. 104 S. Ct. at 619 n.7. After an exhaustive review
of numerous authorities on the subject, the trial court properly concluded that the com-
mon law doctrine of strict liability in tort for abnormally dangerous activities could and
should be applied consistently with the federal scheme of nuclear regulation. 485 F.
Supp. at 572-77.
The Restatement of Torts contemplates the particular appropriateness of applying
strict liability principles to the use of atomic energy. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
520 comments g, h (1977). These principles, however, cannot be used against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1982); see,
e.g., Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972). Thus, strict liability in tort cannot be imposed
on the United States for government related nuclear incidents. See, e.g., McKay v.
United States, 703 F.2d 464, 472 (10th Cir. 1983)(dismissal of nearby landowner's strict
liability claim for property damage from presence of nuclear weapons plant was proper,
but negligence, trespass, and nuisance claims should have been tried under the FTCA. It
should be noted that the Tenth Circuit found the plaintiff's punitive damages claim in-
appropriate based on its Silkwood analysis).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)(1982).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Silkwood's civil rights and constitutional claims related to
an alleged conspiracy by Kerr-McGee to frustrate the union organizing efforts of
Silkwood and other Kerr-McGee employees. Silkwood's complaint also alleged a cover-
up of the alleged Kerr-McGee conspiracy by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743, 745 (10th Cir. 1980)(separate appeal of
Silkwood's civil rights and constitutional claims), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981). The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's dismissal for failure to state a cause of
2
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ety, '' 14 contamination injuries to Karen Silkwood's person,15 and
property destruction. 6 Silkwood sought to avoid the limited
remedies of Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act1 7 by plead-
ing that all the plutonium exposures originated in Silkwood's
apartment, rather than at the Cimmaron plant. Silkwood's the-
ory was that although the plutonium exposures originated in the
apartment, Kerr-McGee had intentionally put the plutonium
there. In support of this theory, the plaintiff presented evidence
that Kerr-McGee or its employees "disliked Silkwood and her
evidence-gathering activities and that plutonium could and did
action, see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 460 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Okla. 1978), was
proper. 637 F.2d at 749.
14. Silkwood's nine days of "fear and anxiety" apparently ran from the date of her
first contamination, November 5, 1974, until her death on November 13, 1974. 667 F.2d
at 912. See also 485 F. Supp. at 595 (jury instruction no. 2). In Kutz ex rel. L.P.S. v.
Lamm, 708 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1983), Judge McKay, in dissent, cited the Silkwood jury's
verdict of $500,000 in actual damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages for "seven
days [sic]" of anxiety as an example of a large recovery for the vindication of an individ-
ual's constitutional rights. Id. at 541 n.* (McKay, J., dissenting).
15. The harmful nature of plutonium was well described by the Tenth Circuit-
Plutonium is an artificially produced radioactive chemical element which has
been instrumental in the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear power.
It emits alpha particles, beta particles, neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays. The
extent of radiation damage to human cells exposed to plutonium is dependent
upon the amount of energy in the radiation. Alpha particles have the largest
mass, carry the greatest amount of energy, and are the most hazardous. Dam-
age can occur when alpha particles strike a cell. Damage to an individual cell is
not, however, invariably harmful to the human body; a cell is capable of repair-
ing itself and the body normally sheds and replaces millions of cells on a con-
tinuous basis. It is acknowledged, however, that plutonium is one of the most
carcinogenic and dangerous substances known.
667 F.2d at 903 (emphasis added). An autopsy revealed that the amount of plutonium in
Silkwood's body at the time of her death was between 25% and 50% of the AEC's per-
missible lifetime body burden. Id. at 914. Although Silkwood's plutonium level was
within the government's permissible body burden, there was evidence that her exposure
for a single year exceeded federal guidelines and regulations. See infra note 128. For a
description of the specific injuries pleaded by plaintiff, see 485 F. Supp. at 595 (jury
instruction no. 2).
16. After repeated detections of contamination of Silkwood's person, her apartment
was monitored and found to be contaminated. 667 F.2d at 914. Silkwood's possessions
had to be destroyed. Id. The value of the destroyed property was stipulated at $5,000. Id.
at 912.
17. Section 11 of the Act imposes liability on an employer "for the disability or
death of his employee resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by the em-
ployee arising out of and in the course of his employment .... " OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85,
§ 11 (West 1955 & Supp. 1984). Section 12 of the Act provides for the exclusivity of the
statutory remedies in cases of section 11 liability. Id. § 12.
3
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escape the plant." '
Kerr-McGee countered with two theories of its own: first,
that Silkwood intentionally took plutonium and contaminated
herself in an effort to embarrass Kerr-McGee, and second, that
Silkwood was contaminated in a job-related accident. 9 The first
theory would free Kerr-McGee from any liability; the second
theory would limit their liability to that provided for under the
Workers' Compensation Act.
The trial court found that the exclusive remedy of workers'
compensation did not apply and allowed all of Silkwood's tort
claims to go to the jury.20 The jury expressly found that
Silkwood had not intentionally contaminated herself,2' and the
trial court found defense evidence of job-relatedness insufficient
either to submit to the jury or to meet the defendant's burden of
proof on that issue. The trial court thus allowed the jury's ver-
dict of $500,000 for personal injuries to stand.22 In addition, the
trial court found that punitive damage awards were not pre-
empted by the federal regulatory scheme and charged the jury
according to Oklahoma's punitive damages statute.23
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that Silkwood's personal injuries should have been com-
pensated under the Workers' Compensation Act.24 The Tenth
Circuit concluded that while the circumstantial evidence was
thin at best, it nevertheless supported a finding of job-related
contamination. 25 Thus, the Tenth Circuit reversed the $500,000
verdict for personal injuries. The court, however, approved the
application of strict liability principles to Silkwood's property
18. 667 F.2d at 915.
19. See id. at 915-19; 485 F. Supp. at 587-88.
20. The jury was instructed on theories of strict liability in tort and negligence with
regard to both personal injuries and property damage. 485 F. Supp. at 597-98 (particu-
larly jury instructions nos. 6, 7, and 9).
21. 667 F.2d at 915; 485 F. Supp. at 588.
22. 485 F. Supp. at 588-89.
23. Id. at 572-77, 583-85. Section 9 of title 23 of the Oklahoma statutes provides:
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, actual or pre-
sumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the
sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1955). The trial court's jury charge was in accordance
with the provisions of the statute. See infra note 92.
24. 667 F.2d at 913-20.
25. Id. at 918-19.
692 [Vol. 36
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damage claim and affirmed the $5,000 verdict for property dam-
age, noting that the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act ap-
plies only to personal injury.26 In addition, the court of appeals
held invalid the trial court's award of punitive damages as in-
consistent with the federal regulation of nuclear radiation
hazards. The sole issue raised by Silkwood on appeal 28 to the
United States Supreme Court was whether federal regulations
preempted the punitive damages award.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF FEDERAL REGULATION
A. Nuclear Energy
The world entered the atomic age in 1945 with the bombing
of Hiroshima. Congress officially entered the atomic age with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946.29 Although this initial legislation
sought to direct "the development and utilization of atomic en-
ergy ... toward improving the public welfare, increasing the
standard of living, strengthening free competition in private en-
terprise, and promoting world peace," 30 it placed strict restric-
tions on the control and use of nuclear material. 1 The primary
motive behind the restrictions was to preserve the United
State's monopolistic position as a nuclear superpower.
32
By 1954, however, the world had changed. The Soviet Union
had the bomb33 and an iron curtain had begun to fall across
26. Id. at 920-21.
27. Id. at 921-23.
28. Silkwood sought to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Su-
preme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2)(1982)(constitutionality of a state statute) by
claiming that the Tenth Circuit's preemption finding necessarily rendered the state pu-
nitive damages statute unconstitutional. 104 S. Ct. at 620. The Supreme Court properly
rejected this jurisdictional contention. The Court noted that not only did the Tenth Cir-
cuit not purport to rule on the constitutionality of the statute, but also the statute's
constitutionality was never in issue. Id. at 621. The Supreme Court, however, noted
probable jurisdiction, 459 U.S. 1101 (1983), and bent over backwards to reach the merits.
Treating Silkwood's jurisdictional statement on appeal as a petition for certiorari, see 28
U.S.C. § 2103 (1982)(authorizing such treatment), the Court granted the petition and
addressed the merits. 104 S. Ct. at 621.
29. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755.
30. Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 1(a), 60 Stat. 755, 756 (1946).
31. Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 5, 60 Stat. 755, 760-63 (1946).
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eastern Europe. 4 Moreover, the peacetime use of nuclear power
as an energy source had become a reality with the construction
of the United States' first large scale atomic power reactor.15
Thus, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,36 amend-
ing the 1946 Act and removing many of the prior restrictions on
private possession and use of nuclear material.37 The 1954 Act
also made provisions for greater freedom in dealing with Euro-
pean allies.3
In 1957, Congress moved again to further promote the de-
velopment of nuclear energy with passage of the Price-Anderson
Act.39 This Act was designed "(1) to assure the public of the
availability of funds sufficient to satisfy liability claims arising
out of a catastrophic nuclear accident; and (2) to remove the im-
pediment to private sector participation in nuclear energy which
existed by reason of potentially enormous liability claims were
such an accident to occur." 40 The basic liability limitation provi-
sions41 of the Act were extended in 196542 and 1975 43 Without
substantial changes. In 1966, however, the Act was significantly
modified by the addition of a waiver requirement for those in-
demnified under provisions of the Act." The waiver requirement
34. In response to the fall of the iron curtain, the United States and its allies be-
came engaged in a common endeavor-"to dam the tide of Red military power and pre-
vent it from engulfing free Europe." Id. at 3458. Congress felt that nuclear superiority
could offset the "numerical superiority of the Communist forces, and serve emphatic
notice on the Soviet dictators that any attempt to occupy free Europe, or to push further
anywhere into the free world, would be foredoomed to failure." Id.
35. Id. at 3458-3459 (60,000 kilowatt reactor under construction).
36. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982)).
37. The 1954 Act allowed for the first time the licensed private use and possession
of nuclear materials for use in the production of electricity. Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 101, 68
Stat. 919, 936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (1982)).
38. Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 144, 68 Stat. 919, 942 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2164 (1982)).
39. Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957)(codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1982)).
40. Comment, The Irradiated Plaintiff: Tort Recovery Outside Price-Anderson, 6
ENvTL. L. 859, 860 (1976)(citing AEC Staff Study of the Price-Anderson Act: Part I, 16
ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 205, 206-07 (1974)).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(1982).
42. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2210(c)-(e), (k)-(l)(1970)).
43. Act of December 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2210(a)-(f), (h), (i), (k), (1), (n)(i), (n)(iii), (o)(3), (o)(4), (p) (1982)).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1982).
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"make[s] clear that in the event of an 'extraordinary nuclear oc-
currence,' the licensee will be strictly liable for the injuries it
causes."
45
Finally, the Atomic Energy Act was amended by the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974.46 Under this amendment, the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the single regulatory agency
responsible for both development and regulation of atomic en-
ergy,47 was abolished and its functions split between the Energy
Research and Development Administration (development)48 and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (regulation).4e Despite this
separation of functions, the overall federal role has not changed.
Today, regulation of the nuclear power industry continues to be
pervasive. 50 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an area of activity
that is subject to greater federal regulation or that more justi-
fies 51 exclusive federal control.
B. Other Areas
Although the area of nuclear energy is perhaps the most
regulated in American society, it is by no means the only area
subject to strict governmental regulation. Government regula-
tion touches us everyday.52 In fact, the number of regulated ac-
tivities and corresponding regulatory agencies has multiplied
dramatically over the past fifty years.53 Justifications for this ex-
plosion include the increasing technical complexity of the
45. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 632 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1982)).
47. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, §§ 3-12, 60 Stat. 755, 758-
71.
48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5811-5821 (1982).
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5851 (1982).
50. See generally Grainey, Nuclear Reactor Regulation: Practice and Procedure
Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 809 (1976); Comment, A
Survey of the Governmental Regulation of Nuclear Power Generation, 59 MARQ. L. REV.
836 (1976).
51. The rising threat of world terrorism makes the continuing need for strict federal
regulation of nuclear materials particularly clear.
52. See K DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.02 (3d ed. 1972).
53. See C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 7-12 (1977). The growth
in federal regulation led one Supreme Court Justice to comment: "The rise of adminis-
trative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century and
perhaps more values today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the




Josey: An Analysis of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. -- Are Punitive Damag
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
696 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
world 54 and the failure of free market regulation.55
Areas of federal concern and federal regulation are numer-
ous and varied. These areas include military conscription, space
exploration, shipping, employment discrimination, environmen-
tal protection, occupational safety, and consumer product
safety.5 Furthermore, the federal government plays an impor-
tant regulatory role in the development and marketing of new
drugs and cosmetics, the design and construction of new
automobiles and aircraft, the marketing and packaging of poi-
54. "Under Democratic and Republican Presidents alike, Congress has regularly
chosen to rely upon administrative regulation . . . to implement public policies in new
and complex areas of federal concern." J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY, THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 5 (1978)(emphasis added). Similarly, de-
veloping technology has led to the discovery of previously unknown product risks and
dangers, and this new knowledge has in turn led to more protective regulation. E.
BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONA-
BLENESS 12 (1982).
55. As one commentator has noted:
The free market model depends ultimately on the assumption that the free
market will best satisfy public values through the instrumentality of the invisi-
ble hand. Yet the evidence is overwhelming that public values and the goals of
firms diverge sharply... [P]rofits and growth are the supreme values for cor-
porations. If firms' discretion were further enlarged through the operation of
the free-market principle, we might expect that in some areas their derelictions
would expand correspondingly, even if some market distortions attributable to
regulation disappeared. Natural gas would flow again, and new drugs would be
produced again. But the costs of the free-market approach might very well
outweigh the benefits; if nineteenth-century experience is any guide, snake oil
and placebos would join new drugs in the marketplace.
A. STONE, ECONOMIC REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 266-68 (1977). Despite
Stone's warnings of a return to the evils of the nineteenth century, many modem politi-
cal ideologues, nevertheless, espouse the virtues of complete deregulation. Deregulation
proponents emphasize the philosophical importance of returning substantial decision-
making power to the individual, giving the individual "the power to choose.., free of a
government nanny. . . ." INSTEAD OF REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULA-
TORY AGENCIES (R. Poole, Jr. ed. 1982). In his introduction, Poole acknowledges that
deregulation "rests on an ethical foundation that recognizes the primacy of [informed,
conscious,] individual choice . . . and full responsibility for one's actions." Id.
What Poole fails to acknowledge is that informed, conscious decisions are made pos-
sible by regulatory disclosure requirements. Furthermore, the costs of litigation, the
availability of insurance, and the human errors of both the bench and bar often protect
the producer from bearing full responsibility for its actions. As two recent authors noted,
"lawsuits are slow, expensive, and chancy; the full deterrent potential of the liability
system is thus muted." E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 54, at 10. Even Sir Edmund
Burke, one of the first and foremost promoters of laissez-faire economic thought, appar-
ently did not envision such a simple disposition of power as Poole suggests. See supra
introductory quote to text.
56. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 54, at 5.
8
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sons, pesticides, and other toxic substances, the development
and marketing of safe nonflammable fabrics, and numerous
other areas.57 Typically, the regulatory acts incorporate a consti-
tutionally based purpose such as promoting public safety5 or
protecting national security.5 9
C. How Regulatory Decisions Are Made
The proper effect of regulatory decisions is best determined
only after consideration of how such decisions are made. For ex-
ample, the per se negligence doctrine presumes that government
safety standards promulgated to protect citizens from a particu-
lar hazard represent, at the least, a reasonably objective deter-
mination of the lowest acceptable level of protection. This ra-
tionale fails if safety standards are determined by flipping a
coin. Thus, sound and deliberate administrative determinations
are entitled to greater deference than quick and arbitrary
determinations.
The role of administrative agencies is to "formulate and
carry out comprehensive regulatory programs for particular in-
dustries or segments of the economy."'" Administrative agencies
generally formulate their regulatory schemes under the rulemak-
ing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).2
APA provisions require publication6 3 of proposed rules64 and al-
57. See generally W.P. KEETON, D. OWEN, & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
AND SAFETY 17-18 (1980).
58. See, e.g., 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2709-2713 (legislative history of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicles Safety Act of 1966, indicating that purpose of bil is
to promote public safety).
59. See, e.g., 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3459-3461 (legislative history of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, indicating that purpose of bill is to promote national secur-
ity and the development of atomic energy).
60. See infra note 105 and sources cited therein.
61. W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCES 133 (1967).
62. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
559 (1982)). Section 4 of the Act sets forth the procedures for administrative rulemaking.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). As in many other areas of legislation, Congress specifically pro-
vided that the APA would apply to all agency action under the Atomic Energy Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1982).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1982).
64. A rule under the act is defined as:
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicabil-
ity and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or pol-
icy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
6971985]
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low for comment from interested parties before the proposals
become effective. e5 The degree of participation and comment al-
lowed will depend on the nature and significance of the proposed
rule. Some rules are so significant that Congress has statutorily
required formal determinations. 6 Because this procedure pro-
motes fairness and efficiency, it should result in sound adminis-
trative determinations.
Administrative procedures for setting standards and adopt-
ing rules are not, however, free from criticism. The notice and
comment procedure laid out in the APA has been criticized as
inadequate to deal effectively with "the greatly increased impor-
tance of the substantive areas that rulemaking now addresses.
'6
7
The evaluation of "hybrid" rulemaking procedures which incor-
porate some of the due process safeguards of more formal ad-
ministrative procedures may be a response to this problem. 8
Additionally, regulations are frequently criticized as inefficient
because they lack accountability to policies of the President and
coordination with other regulatory agencies.6 9 Regulators are
also criticized as subject to the control and influence of the in-
dustries they regulate.7 0 Therefore, the history and development
agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages,
corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities,
appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or account-
ing, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.
Id. § 551(4).
65. Id. § 553(c).
66. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1) (1982)(1957 Amendment to Atomic Energy Act
requires hearing on every construction application whether contested or not).
67. Pedersen, The Decline of Separation of Functions in Regulatory Agencies, 64
VA. L. REV. 991, 1016 (1978).
68. Id. at 1016-17. For discussions of "hybrid" rulemaking procedures, see Fuchs,
Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule Making, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 83,
104-08 (1977); Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability:
The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv.
1276, 1319-26 (1972).
69. See, e.g., Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Com-
missions, 69 YALE. L.J. 931 (1960). See generally Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative
Agencies: Ex Parte Contracts by the White House, 80 COLU. L. REv. 943, 947-49
(1980)(discussion of Carter Administration attempts to make administrative agencies
more responsive). Verkuil notes suggestions that nuclear regulation would be more effec-
tively handled by a single chief executive rather than a collegial commission. Id. at 947
n.25. Accord J. FREEDMAN, supra note 54, at 8-9.
70. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS By INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74-
95 (1955); L. KOHLMAEIER, THE REGULATORS 69-82 (1969). See also P. QUIRK, INDUSTRY
INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 3-21 (1981).
[Vol. 36
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of each individual regulatory determination should be consid-
ered before evidentiary weight is assigned to regulatory compli-
ance. Although this process may be an indirect means of assess-
ing liability, a lay jury seems more capable of evaluating the
objectivity of the procedure used by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in promulgating a radiation standard than of evalu-
ating whether the Commission's standard is in reckless disregard
of the public's safety.
II. EXCLUSIVITY OF FEDERAL REGULATION
A. The Doctrine of Preemption
The doctrine of preemption grants the federal government
the sole authority to regulate a particular area or activity; state
regulatory authority is preempted. 1 Preemption promotes na-
tional uniformity in areas where federal direction is particularly
appropriate.
7 2
Federal preemption is generally based on two elements: con-
gressional intent 3 and constitutional supremacy.7 4 Although
Although generally supportive of a strong regulatory presence, Ralph Nader and his
study groups have been some of the harshest critics of regulatory agencies. See, e.g., J.
TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST (1970)(Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on the Food
and Drug Administration); A. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITrER WAGES (1973)(Ralph Nader's
Study Group Report on Disease and Injury on the Job); D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK,
WATER WASTELAND (1971)(Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Water Pollution); R.
FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION (1970)(Ralph Nader's Study Group Re-
port on the Interstate Commerce Commission and Transportation); E. Cox, R. FELLMETH
& J. SCHULZ, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
71. Black's Law Dictionary defines preemption as follows: "Doctrine adopted by
U.S. Supreme Court holding that certain matters are of such a national... character
that federal laws pre-empt or take precedence over state laws. As such, a state may not
pass a law inconsistent with the federal law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (5th ed.
1979). For a more detailed discussion of preemption in the field of nuclear regulation, see
Jaksetic, Constitutional Dimensions of State Efforts to Regulate Nuclear Waste, 32
S.C.L. REV. 789, 801-10 (1981). For a more detailed discussion of preemption in general,
see Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
72. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144
(1963)(marketing standards for avocados not "a subject demanding exclusive federal reg-
ulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to national interests").
73. As the Eighth Circuit noted,
Once it is ascertained that the federal government possesses the power to regu-
late in a given area, the question is whether Congress has exercised its power of
legislation in such a manner as to exclude the states from asserting concurrent
jurisdiction over the same subject matter.... [A]bsent inevitable collision be-
11
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preemption may be dictated by an express provision in the fed-
eral legislation,7 preemptive intent is more frequently implied
by courts."6 The Eighth Circuit found that Congress had in-
tended that "the processing and utilization of source, by-product
and special nuclear material must be regulated by the United
States in the national interest because of their effect upon in-
terstate and foreign commerce and in order to provide for the
common defense and security and to protect the health and
safety of the public.177 Twelve years later, the United States Su-
preme Court also concluded that the federal government had ex-
clusive authority over the safety aspects of nuclear energy. The
Court stated that "the federal government has occupied the en-
tire field of nuclear safety concerns. . . ,,7a The Court found
that Congress had given the AEC "exclusive jurisdiction to li-
tween the two schemes of regulation it must be determined whether Congress
manifested an intent to displace coincident state regulation, in a given area.
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971)(emphasis
added), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
75. In the Air Quality Act of 1967, for example, Congress provided: "No State or any
political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to
the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to
this part." Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 208(a), 81 Stat. 485, 501 (1967)(codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)(1982)). Similarly, in the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Con-
gress provided: "[N]o state or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect a cautionary labeling requirement. . . unless such cautionary labeling require-
ment is identical to the labeling requirement under [this act]." Pub. L. No. 89-756, §
4(a), 80 Stat. 1303, 1305 (1966)(adding preemptive language to the original act), renum-
bered and amended by Pub. L. No. 91-113, § 4(a), 83 Stat. 187, 189 (1969), amended by
Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 503, 510 (1976)(preemptive language amended to
present form). See generally Parenteau, Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants: A Consti-
tutional Dilemma for the States, 6 ENvm. L. 675, 701-03 (1976).
76. Preemptive intent may be implied from:
(1) the aim and intent of Congress as revealed by the statute itself and its
legislative history .. .; (2) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme as
authorized and directed by the legislation and as carried into effect by the
federal administrative agency. . .; (3) the nature of the subject matter regu-
lated and whether it is one which demands "exclusive federal regulation in
order to achieve uniformity vital to national interests". . .; and ultimately (4)
"whether, under the circumstances of [a] particular case [state] law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d at 1146-47.
77. Id. at 1153 (emphasis in original).
78. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983)(emphasis added).
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cense the transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and
use of nuclear materials. ' '79 Seemingly, this finding left no role
for the states.
B. The Remaining Role of the States
In the wake of federal preemption, the regulatory role of
state governments is limited. Although state agencies may be en-
listed to implement and apply federal standards, 0 they are pro-
hibited from applying state regulations or standards that are in-
consistent with or conflict with federal standards."' Thus, in
preempted areas, state agencies often serve as mere extensions
or branch offices of federal regulators.8 2 Generally, state govern-
ment may continue to act in a preempted area as long as the
purpose of the state action is not to regulate within the pre-
empted area.83
In the field of nuclear energy, the Atomic Energy Act pre-
empted only the regulation of the radiological hazards.8 4 States
may regulate nonradiological hazards of nuclear energy, presum-
ably because the states have more experience and greater exper-
tise in these areas. Nonradiological hazards involve such con-
cerns as plant siting and nuisances from the fogging, icing and
steam of the power plant's cooling pond.8 5
79. Id. at 207 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
80. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 136u, 136v(c), 136w-1 (1982)(provisions of the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act allowing states to develop and administer pro-
grams consistent with federal standards, allowing states to register local pesticides in
compliance with federal standards, and giving states primary enforcement responsibility
as long as state plans and standards have federal approval).
81. See, e.g., id. § 136v.
82. In South Carolina, for example, the Director of the Division of Regulatory and
Public Service Programs, College of Agricultural Science, Clemson University, oversees
the certification and use of pesticides in the state pursuant to federal guidelines and
standards. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-13-20(K), 46-13-30 (Supp. 1984).
83. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. at 216 ("[W]e accept California's avowed economic purpose as the
rationale for enacting [the statute]. Accordingly, the statute lies outside the occupied
field of nuclear safety regulation.").
84. Id. at 210-12; Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d at 1147-54.
85. See Annot., 82 A.L.R.3d 751, 760 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
1985]
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III. DAMAGES IN STATE TORT ACTIONS
A. Actual Damages
Damages in state law tort actions are generally divided into
two categories: actual and punitive.88 Actual damages seek to
compensate the plaintiff for his actual injuries or losses.8 7 Hence,
they are also known as compensatory damages. In tort law, the
measure of actual damages is the amount necessary to restore
the plaintiff to his pre-injury condition.8
Actual damages may include both tangible and intangible
components. The tangible component may include items such as
medical expenses, lost wages and property damage.89 These
items can be objectively determined with reasonable accuracy.
The intangible component includes awards for subjective inju-
ries such as "fear and anxiety"' 0 or pain and suffering."- Al-
though not capable of objective determination, these damages
are nevertheless theoretically actual.
B. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages in tort seek to punish the defendant for
wrongful conduct.9 2 Punitive damages, like fines levied by regu-
86. J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 188 (2d ed. 1981).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 comment a (1977).
88. J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 86, at 188. Of course, restoration is not
always possible, and thus the law seeks to determine "the monetary value of the differ-
ence between the plaintiff's preinjury and postinjury conditions." Id. at 188-89.
89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 (1977).
90. See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text.
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 comments b, e (1977).
92. "In any action like the one before you, the jury may give damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishment, if the jury finds the defendant or defendants have
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed." Silkwood, 485 F. Supp.
at 603 (jury instruction no. 19). See also Oklahoma's punitive damages statute, supra
note 23. Generally, the level of wrongful conduct required to support a punitive damages
award does not rise to the degree of culpability expressly described in Oklahoma's puni-
tive damages statute. In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), the Supreme Court noted
and approved of the widespread acceptance of the Restatement rule "that punitive dam-
ages in tort cases may be awarded not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but
also for recklessness, serious indifference to or disregard for the rights of others ......
Id. at 48 (noting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2)(1977)). In fact, the Supreme
Court noted that Oklahoma may have adopted this lower standard in modification of its
statute. 461 U.S. at 47 n.13 (citing Smith v. Johnston, 591 P.2d 1260 (Okla. 1978)).
[Vol. 36
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latory agencies,9 3 are designed to deter wrongful conduct in the
future and thus compel compliance with a higher standard of
conduct.9 4 Punitive damages serve an important function when
other forms of punishment and deterrence are unavailable or in-
adequate.9 5 One of the problems with punitive damage awards is
that the higher standard of conduct sought to be imposed by the
awarding jury may not be clear. Thus, the defendant is given
little guidance on how to improve his conduct in the future.
Incidental to their regulatory purpose, punitive damages re-
sult in a "windfall" to the tort victim who generally must receive
full compensation by actual damages as a prerequisite to recov-
ery of punitive damages.9 6 In practice, punitive damages may ac-
tually help the plaintiff pay for his legal fees.97 This practice and
the historical unavailability of compensatory damages for cer-
tain intangible injuries98 has led many commentators to charac-
terize punitive damages as compensatory-at least in part.99
This characterization can be misleading, however, since
under the "American Rule" attorney's fees are not considered
93. The NRC, for example, has the power to impose fines on any person who vio-
lates the license requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2282(a)(1982).
94. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 628 (1984)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 49 (1983)).
95. As one author has noted, "punitive damages [attempt] to achieve, through civil
litigation, results otherwise associated with the criminal law." Note, The Imposition of
Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1158, 1158-59 (1966). The author concludes that, "punitive damages [are] a useful substi-
tute for criminal law in areas where criminal punishment is inappropriate." Id. at 1184.
See also Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 628 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(characterizing "punitive
damages as 'private fines levied by civil juries' ")(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
96. See, e.g., Aubertin v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Woodson County, Kansas, 588
F.2d 781, 786 (10th Cir. 1978). Punitive damages are also a "windfall" to the tort victim
when there are no actual damages but nominal damages are awarded. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 comment c (1979)("an award of nominal damages (see [id.] §
907) is enough to support a further award of punitive damages").
97. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 at 9 (5th ed. 1984).
98. See id. (wounded feelings as an element of damage not legally compensable).
See also Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORuM 411, 412-13 (1972)(his-
torical unavailability of compensatory damages as a justification for punitive damages no
longer exists because of the expanding scope of compensatory damages).
99. See Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 870,
875-76 (1976); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REv. 1258, 1295-99 (1976); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis:
Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 381-82 (1976); Note, The Imposition of Punish-
ment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, 1162-
63 (1966).
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part of the plaintiff's actual damages.10 0 An award of attorney's
fees, or punitive damages earmarked for attorneys, does not
compensate the tort victim for an injury proximately caused by
the tort; it simply reimburses the victim for a voluntary expense
incurred after the tort.
C. Regulatory Effect
All civil liability has potential regulatory impact; even the
mere obligation to compensate tort victims could promote safer
conduct in the future. That is not, however, why compensatory
damages are awarded. Compensatory damages are awarded for
the sole purpose of restoring the tort victim to his pretort condi-
tion;101 the regulatory effect of compensatory damages is merely
incidental. In contrast, the sole purpose of punitive damages is
to regulate conduct,10 2 not to incidentally compensate the
plaintiff.
The use of punitive damage awards to reimburse the tort
victim's legal fees generally will not change their exclusive regu-
latory purpose except perhaps in those jurisdictions where puni-
tive damages are measured by reference to the plaintiff's attor-
ney's fees 0 3 instead of the defendant's conduct and wealth.10 4 Of
course, even in jurisdictions in which punitive damages are in-
tended to compensate litigation expenses, punitive damages will
have the same incidental regulatory effect as do all damage
awards.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN REGULATED AREAS
Failure to comply with statutory and regulatory safety stan-
dards constitutes negligence per se.0 5 Statutory or regulatory
100. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)(reaf-
firming the "American Rule" that each litigant bear its own attorney's fees absent statu-
tory authorization to the contrary). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914
(1977).
101. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment f (1977). See, e.g., Moffa
v. Perkins Trucking Co., 200 F. Supp. 183, 186 (D. Conn. 1961); Triangle Sheet Metal
Workers, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (1966).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1977).
105. The negligence per se rule is limited, however, to those statutory or regulatory
704 [Vol. 36
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compliance, on the other hand, has generally only been consid-
ered mere evidence of due care.1 6 Thus, governmental standards
safety standards whose purpose is:
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is in-
vaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). Once the requisite protective purpose is
found, violation of the standard is "negligence in itself." Id. § 288B(1). See, e.g., Ezagui
v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979); Sanchez v. J. Barron Rice, Inc., 77
N.M. 717, 427 P.2d 240 (1967); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920)(ab-
sence of lights on vehicle, required by statute for the protection and guidance of others,
is negligence in itself). See generally Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort
Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1932); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27
HARv. L. REV. 317 (1914); Note, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16
MINN. L. Rnv. 361 (1932).
106. Chief Judge Theis of the District of Kansas, sitting as a judge of the Western
District of Oklahoma in Silkwood, instructed the jury.
You are instructed that [government standards for radiation exposure] may be
considered by you as evidence of expert scientific and medical opinions on
what levels of exposures may result in actual physical injuries, of whatever se-
verity, to persons who work in such facilities. You may consider this evidence
as any other expert opinion, and you should give it such weight and credit to
which you deem it entitled, when viewed in connection with all other facts and
circumstances.
You are instructed, however, that you are not bound by these standards.
Compliance with such standards does not necessarily mean injury cannot occur
for which liability may be imposed.
485 F. Supp. at 598-99 (jury instruction no. 11)(emphasis added). See W. PROSSER &
W.P. KEETON, supra note 97, § 36 at 233 n.37 (compliance with statutory standard is
nonconclusive evidence of due care); RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965)(in-
dicating that statutory/regulatory compliance does not preclude finding of negligence).
See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (10th Cir. 1976) (plane man-
ufactured and certified in accordance with Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations);
Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975)(defendant's drug
warning in technical compliance with FDA requirements); Raymond v. Riegel Textile
Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1973)(compliance with Flammable Fabrics Act);
Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965)(compliance with
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)); Stevens v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973)(en banc)(compliance with F.D.A.
regulation); Burch v. Amsterdam, 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976)(compliance with Federal
Hazardous Substances Act); Hill v. Husky Briquetting Inc., 54 Mich. App. 17, 220
N.W.2d 137, aft'd, 393 Mich. 136, 223 N.W.2d 290 (1974)(compliance with state labeling
statute); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (1978)(compliance with
federal drug labeling requirements); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d
1322 (1978)(FAA certification of plane design and manufacture). See generally Campbell
& Vargo, The Flammable Fabrics Act and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 IND. L. REV. 395
(1976); Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation, 41 No-
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are treated as the minimum level of conduct necessary to avoid
the presumption of per se negligence. The reasonable man stan-
dard, used in the determination of civil liability, is therefore pre-
sumably higher than or equal to the standards promulgated by
regulatory agencies; but how much higher?
Because the reasonable man standard is based on "an exter-
nal and objective [judgment], rather than the individual judg-
ment, good or bad, of the particular actor. . .,-"7 this standard
is theoretically always the same.108 Thus, the difference between
the objective standard of liability in tort law and the minimum
safety standard set by government regulators will depend on the
character of the government regulation. 0 9 Similarly, the differ-
ence, if any, between the punitive liability standard,1 0 which is
also theoretically constant, and the governmental safety stan-
dard will depend on the regulation. For example, minimal com-
pliance with an automobile headlight regulation promulgated by
a state highway department in 1930 might nevertheless consti-
tute "reckless disregard" for the safety of others when the state
of the art"' over fifty years later indicates that much greater
TRE DAME LAW. 1 (1965). It is interesting to note that punitive damages were not
awarded in any of the cases listed above.
107. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 97, § 32 at 173-74 (footnotes omit-
ted)(citing, in part, Seavy, Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1927)).
108. Id.
109. As Justice Linde of the Supreme Court of Oregon noted, "The role of [regula-
tory] compliance should logically depend on whether the goal to be achieved by the par-
ticular government standards, the balance struck between safety and its costs, has been
set higher or lower than that set by the rules governing . . .civil liability." Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 81, 577 P.2d 1322, 1333 (1978)(Linde, J., concur-
ring)(airplane compliance with FAA standards). Of course, it has already been noted that
courts generally find government standards lower than civil liability standards, see supra
note 106 and accompanying text, but, as Judge Linde points out, how much lower, if at
all, should depend on the particular regulation and the nature of the safety-costs balance
found in that regulation. Superficially, at least, the district court in Silkwood considered
the nature of nuclear regulations. See infra note 112. The Model Uniform Products Lia-
bility Act and several state statutes provide for defenses based on regulatory statutory
compliance. MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. AcT § 108; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (Supp.
1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-05 (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (1977).
These statutes are overbroad to the extent they fail to fully consider the numerous fac-
tors suggested by the presenftu-thori See infra text accompanying notes 112-16.
110. The standard used to determine liability for punitive damages is "oppression,
fraud or malice" or "reckless disregard." See supra note 92.
111. Generally, state of the art refers to the technological or economic capacity to
know of and/or reduce the dangers associated with product use. Phillips, The Standard
[Vol. 36
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illumination is possible. Thus, one obvious important character-
istic of the regulation is its timeliness. 112 Other relevant factors
for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 101, 103-18
(1977). State of the art may, however, only be considered in technological terms without
regard to the economic feasibility of acquiring the knowledge and/or reducing the dan-
ger. See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LiABiLrrY § 6.05[15] at 104.38 (1978).
The state of the art is frequently used as a defense in products liability cases involving
allegations of defective design or failure to warn. For general discussions of the concept
and its use as a defense, see Karasik, "State of the Art or Science": Is It a Defense to
Products Liability?, 60 ILL. B.J. 348 (1972); O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State
of the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627 (1978); Raleigh,
The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old "Defense," 4 OHIO
N.U.L. REv. 249 (1977).
Arguably, consideration of the state of the art is only appropriate with liability de-
terminations based upon fault. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191,
204, 447 A.2d 539, 546 (1982)(a products liability case in which the court noted, "Essen-
tially, state-of-the-art is a negligence defense. It seeks to explain why defendants are not
culpable. . . . But in strict liability cases, culpability is irrelevant."). But see Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984)(effectively overruling Beshada
although expressly only restricting it to its circumstances). The Beshada conclusion that
state of the art is irrelevant to strict liability determinations is based on the Wade/Kee-
ton notion that all knowledge of product danger "as it is proved to be at the time of
trial" is imputed to the defendant manufacturer at the time it sold or marketed the
product. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 38
(1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
834-35 (1973). But see Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavail-
able Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 761-64 (1983)(Dean Wade, like the New
Jersey Supreme Court, has apparently changed his mind although he states that differ-
ences between his position and Dean Keeton's position were always present); Keeton,
The Meaning of Defect in Product Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo.
L. REv. 579, 595 (1980)(Dean Keeton now indicates that state of the art "at the time the
product was designed" is a relevant factor in assessing liability).
Liability for punitive damages is a fault-based determination. See text accompany-
ing notes 92-95. Thus, even if consideration of the state of the art is inappropriate for
determining strict liability in tort on compensatory claims, it is a proper factor in consid-
ering punitive damages. Thus, the careful plaintiff may want to shun a claim for punitive
damages in order to avoid introduction of state of the art evidence. In Silkwood, the
defendant, Kerr-McGee, was held negligent and strictly liable for an abnormally danger-
ous activity. See supra note 11. Consideration of the state of the art in plutonium con-
trol and regulation would have been particularly appropriate in Silkwood's negligence
cause of action and her claim for punitive damages.
112. In fact, the timeliness of federal nuclear regulations was considered by the dis-
trict court in Silkwood. The court gave particular emphasis to the time element because
the AEC was inexperienced in nuclear regulation when the atomic industry was begin-
ning, 485 F. Supp. at 579 (quoting Trowbridge, Licensing and Regulation of Private
Atomic Energy Activities, 34 TEx. L. REv. 842, 843-51 (1956)), and because the evolution
of nuclear knowledge and regulation was continuing, 485 F. Supp. at 580 (citing author-
ity published more contemporaneous with Silkwood's exposure). The district court
stated that the evolutionary nature of the state of the art in the nuclear industry and the
related evolution of government regulation "support[ed] the proposition that the general
19
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rule (that regulatory compliance or noncompliance be treated only as inconclusive evi-
dence of care] should be no different for the atomic industry ... [T]oo many variables
exist in any given situation for an absolute standard to apply." 485 F. Supp. at 580.
Although the district court properly introduced the time element, perhaps it incorrectly
assumed that, because nuclear regulation was evolving, the applicable regulations at any
given time must necessarily be so far behind that they deserve little deference. This, of
course, is not necessarily the case.
In fact, the nuclear industry has historically been more closely regulated than other
industrial areas. Unlike most areas in which federal regulation was imposed after devel-
opment of the industry, federal regulation of the nuclear industry developed as a matter
of national security before the private industry had really begun. See supra notes 29-51
and accompanying text. This distinction supports the proposition that perhaps the gen-
eral rule should not apply. Although the trial court acknowledged that "the maximum
permissible exposure ceiling has been frequently rendered more stringent over the
years," 485 F. Supp. at 581 (citing Rogers, The Development and Use of Regulatory
Standards, 14 ATOM. ENERGY. L.J. 173, 178 (1972); Goodman, Radiation Injuries, 5
ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 20, 23 (1963)), and that several writers suggest that "greater defer-
ence be given governmental exposure limits," 485 F. Supp. at 582, 581-83 (citing Keyes &
Howarth, Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes: The Low Level Radiation Exam-
ple, 56 IOWA L. REv. 531, 567-69 (1971); E. STASON, S. ESTEP & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE
LAW 127-28 (1959)), the court nevertheless adhered to the general rule on regulatory
compliance.
The trial court repeatedly emphasized that exposures within governmental stan-
dards may still be injurious. 485 F. Supp. at 580-81 (citing various law review articles
discussing the permissible exposure regulations promulgated by the AEC). While this
may demonstrate the need for victim compensation despite regulatory compliance, see
Silkwood, 485 F. Supp. at 583 (citing Hamilton & Krebs, Radiation Protection Regula-
tion: An Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 12 VAND. L. REV. 395, 407-08
(1959))(basic problem of radiation protection is ascertaining how much exposure may be
permitted; separate problem is determining what special measures are required to pro-
vide compensation to those injured by such exposure), it does not demonstrate that the
cost-benefit balance represented by government regulations, see Silkwood, 485 F. Supp.
at 581 (government standards represent cost-benefit balance)(citing law review articles
discussing the cost-benefit balance), shows such little regard for human safety that a
defendant in compliance can nevertheless be considered in reckless disregard of human
safety and subjected to punitive damages. To reach such a conclusion, one would have to
consider federal nuclear regulators in breach of their statutory duty to "protect health
[and] minimize danger to life or property." 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b)(1982)(describing the
NRC's duties in connection with establishing rules, regulations and standards governing
the use and possession of nuclear material).
The trial court compared its conclusion that conduct justifying punitive damages is
not inconsistent with regulatory compliance to Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F.
Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969), and Gillham v. Admiral
Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1965). Silkwood, 485 F. Supp. at 584. The relevancy of
these cases is not at all clear. In Tinnerholm, there were no applicable government regu-
lations. See 285 F. Supp. at 448 n.12. Although punitive damages were indeed awarded in
Gillham for the defendant's reckless failure to redesign its product or warn against the
dangers of product use, 523 F.2d at 109, government regulations were not even consid-
ered in the case.
The district court in Silkwood charged the jury that the defendant's good faith com-
pliance with regulatory standards Would be evidence of conduct inconsistent with the
20
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include the purpose of the regulation,113 the procedure employed
by the agency in its development,114 the creditability and ac-
countability of the regulators,1 5 and the general nature of the
safety-costs balance found in the regulation."i6
Of course, an evaluation of the nature and characteristics of
a governmental regulation to determine its logical role in tort
actions is only necessary if that role is not specified in the legis-
lation or regulation itself. Rarely does a legislative enactment or
government regulation specify that it is the sole standard to be
used in assessing civil liability.117 Legislative enactments and
governmental regulations do, however, frequently specify" 8 or
imply"19 that they are the exclusive regulatory standards.
Because punitive damages are only regulatory in nature,'
120
those legislative enactments and regulations which specify or im-
ply that they are the exclusive regulatory standards should pre-
empt the award of punitive damages whether the standards are
complied with or not.12 1 Furthermore, if government regulatory
mental state requisite for punitive damages. In an area of strict and timely regulations,
compliance should be more than mere evidence; it should be conclusive as a matter of
law. In Silkwood, a charge giving greater deference to regulatory compliance may not
have made a difference; there was conflicting evidence on the issue of regulatory compli-
ance. See infra note 128.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 134-49.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 60-70.
115. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
117. In fact, legislative enactments frequently specify that compliance is not to be
considered a defense to liability. Consider, for example, the following provision from the
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehi-
cle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law." Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 108(c), 80 Stat. 718, 723 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c)(1982))(emphasis added).
118. See supra note 75.
119. See supra note 76.
120. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
121. The Tenth Circuit noted in Silkwood:
Arguably there should be a strong presumption against preemption of
state laws affecting such vital interests of its citizens .... However, the nu-
clear industry was initially developed by the Federal government, is closely
linked with national security, and is extensively regulated by a Federal agency.
This apparently is the basis upon which Northern States was decided .... A
judicial award of exemplary damages under state law. . . is no less intrusive
than direct legislative acts of the state. Thus we hold punitive damages may
not be awarded in this case.
It does not matter whether Kerr-McGee violated AEC regulations in the
conduct of its plant operations. The AEC (NRC) has comprehensive powers to
21
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standards are set high enough, compliance should preclude a pu-
nitive damages award even absent regulatory preemption. In
fact, the continuing value of regulatory agencies that set safety
standards so low that they fail to preclude findings. of "reckless
disregard" for safety is doubtful. This, of course, is the implica-
tion made by the Supreme Court in Silkwood.122
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its predecessor,
the Atomic Energy Commission, were saddled with a statutory
duty to establish rules, regulations and standards to "promote
the common defense and security [and] to protect health or to
minimize danger to life or property.' ' 23 Assuming Kerr-McGee
substantially complied with all applicable federal regulations,1
2 4
the Silkwood jury's punitive damages verdict indicates that
Commission standards and regulations were in "reckless disre-
gard" of public health and safety. Although the federal govern-
ment is always immune from liability for punitive damages, 25
the government may be subjected to compensatory damages for
punish and prohibit practices it regards as improper ... and [to] seek civil
and criminal penalties.
667 F.2d at 923 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The procedural safeguards of crim-
inal law have not been extended, however, to punitive damage awards. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
122. There was evidence presented at the Silkwood trial indicating that nuclear
safety standards were in "reckless disregard" of public safety. As the court noted:
[F]ederal regulation and regulatory guidelines would permit .5 grams of pluto-
nium to escape their facility without detection, even assuming complete com-
pliance with federal regulations and perfect operation of all detection equip-
ment. Thus, a single worker who left the facility building twice per day could
remove without detection 1 gram of plutonium per day, or 1 pound of pluto-
nium over approximately 19 months. Two workers could achieve the same re-
sult in less than a year. Regulations controlling inventory difference would per-
mit this facility to have approximately nine or ten pounds of plutonium
unaccounted for, so loss of this one pound could easily go unnoticed. A Kerr-
McGee witness characterized the implications of this 1 pound of plutonium in
the public domain as "sheer havoc and death." Even the potentially very grave
dangers of one half gram of plutonium in the public domain were agreed upon
by virtually all witnesses.
485 F. Supp. at 576. In contrast, Justice Powell's dissent to the Supreme Court's opinion
gives credit for the safe development of nuclear energy to the regulation and oversight of
the AEC and NRC. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 638 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b)(1982).
124. For a discussion of the evidence of Kerr-McGee's regulatory compliance, see
infra note 128.
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982)(punitive damages liability excepted from the gov-
ernment's waiver of tort liability in the Federal Tort Claims Act).
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negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act.126 Because the
Commission's rule-making, standard-setting duty is discretion-
ary, however, the government could probably escape liability
through the "discretionary function" exception to the Act.
12 7
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE Silkwood HOLDING
In Silkwood, the United States Supreme Court allowed a
jury's imposition of punitive damages despite the defendant's
compliance"2 8 with the exclusive federal regulatory scheme. 29
126. Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424,60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946)(codified in scattered
provisions throughout the Code; major provisions codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402,
2671-2680 (1982)).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 provides in part:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to
(a) Any claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in-
volved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982). This statutory exception for discretionary functions precludes
tort recovery based on many administrative determinations, such as developing plans or
setting specifications. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955);
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See generally L. JAYSON, HANDLING FED-
ERAL TORT CLAIMS (1978); Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary
Function Exception Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161 (1976); James, The Federal Tort
Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function" Exception, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 184 (1957).
128. Actually, it is questionable whether Kerr-McGee complied with the applicable
federal regulations. Although the NRC's report on their investigation of the Silkwood
incident indicated that Kerr-McGee's only regulatory violation throughout the incident
was its failure to maintain a record of the dates of two samples of Silkwood's urine, 104
S. Ct. at 619; 104 S. Ct. at 629 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 104 S. Ct. at 636 (Powell,
J., dissenting)(citing AEC Regulatory Operations Investigatory Report No. 74-09, De-
cember 16, 1974, at 5), the trial court noted that "[t]here was evidence of regulatory
noncompliance." 485 F. Supp. at 586. Specifically,
[a] Kerr-McGee witness . .. conceded that the defendants' inventory differ-
ence, or the amount of plutonium unaccounted for by the defendants at their
facility, slightly exceeded that permitted by regulation. An NRC official called
by defendants testified that he did not feel that Kerr-McGee was conforming
its conduct to the "as low as is reasonably achievable" [see 10 C.F.R. §
20.1(c)(1984)] standard. Dr. Karl Morgon, a plaintiff's witness, testified that
Silkwood's exposure did not conform to ICRP [International Commission on
Radiological Protection] guidelines and part 20 of the federal regulations for
an exposure received within a single year, even though Silkwood's burden was
within the regulation limits for a lifetime exposure. [See supra note 15.]
Other regulations control defendant's conduct in the instant situation.
They forbid a licensee from possessing, using or transferring plutonium in such
a manner that radiation levels in unrestricted areas could exceed prescribed
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Thus, the Court cast doubt not only on the vitality of the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission but also on governmental regula-
tion in general. In addition, the decision threatens to undermine
the delicate balance of federalism established under the doctrine
of preemption.
In Silkwood, the Court acknowledged that "Congress' deci-
sion to prohibit the states from regulating the safety aspects of
nuclear development was premised on its belief that the Com-
mission was more qualified to determine what type of safety
standards should be enacted in this complex area."'130 The Court
then proceeded to ignore both this sound premise and its previ-
ous declaration of complete preemption. The Court found that
"the preempted field does not extend as far as Kerr-McGee
would have it.' 131 But how much farther can preemption extend
beyond the "entire field"? 32 In a blind effort to preserve state
law remedies for irradiated plaintiffs, the Court allowed lay ju-
rors to impose punitive damages in one of the most technologi-
cally complex areas known to man. As Justice Powell noted in
his dissent, "The Court. . . is willing to allow a jury, untrained
in even the most rudimentary aspects of nuclear technology, to
impose heavy penalties on the basis of its own perceptions or
prejudices.' 1 33 Even in the year 1790, Sir Edmund Burke knew
better than to support such a simple disposition of regulatory
affairs.
The Silkwood majority seems to have a nuclear blind spot;
"its entire analysis proceeds as if pre-emption of punitive dam-
ages would require pre-emption of compensatory damages as
well."'1 34 Of course, that is not the case. Punitive damages are
readily distinguished from compensatory damages by their di-
levels. 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.105(b), 20.106(a)(1974)[current regulation materially the
same]. Although the parties disagree, the record contains some evidence that
the level of plutonium in Silkwood's apartment may potentially have exceeded
that permitted in an unrestricted area, such as a residence.
485 F. Supp. at 586 (footnote omitted).
129. Compliance is, of course, irrelevant. All regulatory state action is preempted.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
130. 104 S. Ct. at 622 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 622.
132. The Supreme Court declared the "entire field" of nuclear safety preempted in
1983. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
133. 104 S. Ct. at 640 n.15 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 631 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 36712
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rect regulatory purpose. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,13
the Court concluded that only state action with a direct regula-
tory purpose was preempted by federal regulation and thus up-
held a state statute which had an economic purpose but an indi-
rect regulatory effect.
136
In a recent court of appeals decision, a defendant pesticide
manufacturer sought, like Kerr-McGee, to use preemption as a
defense. In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 37 the defendant's
herbicide, Paraquat, complied with the extensive labeling regu-
lations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."38 The
defendant further argued that an amendment to the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted
state regulation of labeling and packaging of substances subject
to that Act. 39 The court of appeals, nevertheless, affirmed the
trial court's judgment of $60,000 in compensatory damages for
the survival and wrongful death actions.
Although the court addressed the issues of preemption and
the weight to be afforded regulatory compliance in the wrong
order,140 it reached the correct result on each issue. The court
first considered the proper weight to be given to compliance
with federal labeling regulations and correctly concluded that,
"The fact that EPA has determined that Chevron's label is ade-
quate for purposes of FIFRA does not compel a jury to find that
the label is also adequate for purposes of state tort law as well.
The purposes of FIFRA and those of state tort law may be quite
distinct.1' The court next concluded that state damage actions
were not precluded by FIFRA's preemptive provision because
compensatory damage verdicts do not directly regulate pesticide
135. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
136. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
137. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 1532, 1539-40.
139. "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for label-
ing or packaging in addition to or different from those required pursuant to this Act."
Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 24(b), 86 Stat. 973, 997 (1972)(codified at 7 U.S.C. §
136v(b)(1982)).
140. Because a finding of federal preemption would render an evaluation of the na-
ture and characteristics of the federal regulations unnecessary, the possibility of preemp-
tion should be analyzed first.
141. 736 F.2d at 1540 (emphasis in original).
1985]
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labeling. 142
Although the circuit court in Ferebee cites the Supreme
Court's Silkwood opinion twice in its analysis,145 it does not ad-
dress the Silkwood issue of punitive damages preemption. The
court's emphasis in Ferebee on the compensatory nature of the
plaintiff's verdict would imply, however, that regulatory dam-
ages were not considered consistent with exclusive federal regu-
lation. In Silkwood, the Court glossed over the distinctions be-
tween compensatory and punitive damages by broadly focusing
on the congressional intent that state tort law remedies remain
available to the victims of nuclear accidents.
144
Relying on the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act
and its amendments, 46 the Court concluded that, "Congress as-
sumed that state-law remedies ...were available to those in-
jured by nuclear incidents.' ' 46 Because "[p]unitive damages
have long been a part of traditional state tort law,' 147 the Court
further concluded that punitive damages are not preempted. 48
The Court ignored, however, those portions of the legislative his-
tory which make it clear that the purpose of the Price-Anderson
Act was to provide a strict liability, indemnification system as an
alternative to compensatory state tort law in cases of "extraordi-
nary nuclear occurrence.'
14
142. The verdict itself does not command Chevron to alter its label-the ver-
dict merely tells Chevron that, if it chooses to continue selling paraquat in
Maryland, it may have to compensate for some of the resulting injuries. That
may in some sense impose a burden on the sale of paraquat in Maryland, but it
is not equivalent to a direct regulatory command that Chevron change its
label.
Id. at 1541 (emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying notes 101-04 (discussion
of distinction between incidental regulatory nature of compensatory damages and direct
regulatory purposes of punitive damages).
143. 736 F.2d at 1542-43.
144. 104 S. Ct. at 623-26.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 625.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 625-26.
149. See id. at 633 n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)("[T]he legislative history of the
Act. . .when read in context, makes clear that its objective is to provide compensation
to persons that suffer injuries. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, re-
printed in 1957 US. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 1803, 1810 (Price-Anderson offers 'a practi-
cal approach to the necessity of providing adequate protection against liability arising
from atomic hazards as well as a sound basis for compensating the public for any possi-
ble injury or damage arising from such hazards')(emphasis supplied).").
[Vol. 36
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The Court in Silkwood sought to justify its decision further
by emphasizing that it was Kerr-McGee's burden to show pre-
emption1 50 and by noting Kerr-McGee's failure "to point to any-
thing in the legislative history or in the regulations that indi-
cate[d] that punitive damages were not to be allowed."' 1 The
Court failed, however, to realize that its prior decisions on puni-
tive damages 52 and nuclear regulation 5 3 indicate that punitive
damages should not be allowed. The Court also failed to show
anything in the legislative history that expressly indicates that
punitive damages are to be allowed in nuclear accident claims.
The Court only pointed to a waiver form developed by the
Atomic Energy Commission following the 1966 amendment to
the Price-Anderson Act. 5 4 The waiver specifically provides that
it does "not apply to. . . [a]ny claim for punitive or exemplary
damages . .. ""'. Although this provision indicates that the
Commission contemplated the possibility of a punitive damages
award, the United States Supreme Court should not be swayed
from its prior case law by the mere contemplation of a regula-
tory commission; the tail should not be allowed to wag the dog.
Under the American constitutional concept of federalism,
the original states delegated most of their sovereign power to the
central government. 15 The range of powers given up by the
states and specifically granted to the federal government is quite
broad. 15 7 The doctrine of preemption effectively preserves this
constitutional division of power and prevents state interference
with broad, constitutionally designated areas of federal concern.
The Court's failure in Silkwood to recognize the preemption of
punitive damages raises doubts about the continued ability of
Congress to preclude state interference absent an express pre-
emption clause which specifically mentions punitive damages.
State governments can now impose direct regulation despite
150. 104 S. Ct. at 625 (citing IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 53 (1979)(Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
151. 104 S. Ct. at 625.
152. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
153. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983). See also supra notes 4, 78, 79 and accompanying text.
154. 104 S. Ct. at 625 n.17.
155. 10 C.F.R. § 140.91 at 851, 852 (1984).
156. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (A. Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison).
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (legislative powers); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
(executive powers); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (judicial powers).
1985] 715
27
Josey: An Analysis of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. -- Are Punitive Damag
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
constitutional principles and congressional intent that state reg-
ulation be precluded.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Silkwood effectively limits
Congress' ability to preclude state interference with federal reg-
ulators and casts doubt on the continuing vitality and statutory
fulfillment of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Congress
may now want to amend once again the Atomic Energy Act by
adding an express preemption provision.
In the future, the Court should follow a thorough two-step
analysis of punitive damage claims in heavily regulated areas.
First, the Court should employ its traditional preemption analy-
sis to determine the existence and extent of any possible regula-
tory preemption. Second, in the absence of complete preemption
or preemption of punitive damages, the Court should thoroughly
evaluate the development and nature of the applicable regula-
tory scheme to determine if compliance should preclude a puni-
tive damages award. The Court's analysis of the nuclear regula-
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